Introduction
My purpose in this article is to look backwards, over nearly 30 years of case law and legislative reform since the judiciary first derived a 'best interests' test for the medical treatment of adults who lack capacity from the doctrine of necessity, and forwards, in order to advocate an even more patient-centred approach. I will acknowledge that there has been a sea-change in the way in which decisions are taken for people who lack capacity, from the 'doctor knows best' paternalism of Re F (Mental Patient:
1 to the recent humane and empathetic judgments in the Court of Protection. The Mental
Capacity Act 2005 was a staging post on this drive towards respect for the patient's point of view, but the judiciary, to its credit, has taken this further still. It could be argued that the Court of Protection is now working with a presumption that the patient's wishes should be accorded some level of primacy which goes beyond the wording on the face of the statute, and which is, importantly, out of step with how the best interests test is interpreted 'on the ground'. In the light of this, and the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 2 I will advocate a slightly more structured working model, which places the adult who lacks capacity unequivocally at the heart of decisions about her medical treatment.
Softening the capacity 'cliff-edge'
The central problem is that the law inevitably draws a bright line between those who do, and those who not have the mental capacity to make decisions. 3 If there is to be legislation (or a common law regime) to protect the interests of those who cannot take decisions for themselves, there has to be a test for incapacity, and it is in the nature of such a test that some patients will pass it, while others will fail. The 4 participate directly in any court proceedings in which her best interests are to be determined. 20 As Helen J Taylor has put it: 'The MCA has drawn attention to the need for decision makers to consider a range of issues wider than the patient's clinical interests, yet provides insufficient guidance on how the statutory principles should be applied in practice'. 21 On the face of the statute, P's wishes and beliefs are just one of any number of considerations that should be taken into account when determining what is in her best interests.
My purpose in this article is to consider the advantages and disadvantages of providing additional guidance to decision-makers in order to help them steer a path between taking seriously the wishes of people who lack capacity, while at the same time not abandoning patients who need help and support to their 'autonomy', where to do so might amount to neglect or ill-treatment. More specifically, this article will consider whether it might be possible essentially to formalise current best practice in the Court of
Protection by deriving a series of rebuttable presumptions, or to put it less stridently, 'starting points ', 22 from existing statutory provisions and human rights instruments. But before coming to how this might work in practice, and the relative merits of structured versus unstructured discretion, it is first important to acknowledge that much more dramatic changes than the ones I advocate here have taken place in the courts over the course of the last 28 years.
3.

From Re F to Aintree and beyond
It is worth reminding ourselves that, while medical treatment had been provided to patients who lacked capacity for hundreds of years, until 1989 the basis for its legality was opaque. 23 As Lord Goff pointed out in Re F (Mental Patient: Sterilisation) :
Indeed, in a non-medical case, YLA v PM, MZ [2013] EWHC 4020 (COP) Parker J specifically declined an invitation to meet P in order to ascertain her wishes and feelings, explaining at [34] that 'I was particularly concerned … that I was being asked to form my own assessment of the strength of her wishes and feelings: and indeed capacity. In children's cases the court sees the child for the purpose of allowing wishes and feelings to be expressed and to allow the child to feel part of the proceedings: the meeting is not to be used for gathering evidence'. 21 H.J. Taylor, 'What are "best interests"? A critical evaluation of "best interests" decision-making in clinical practice ' (2016) 24 Medical Law Review . 22 If these presumptions were alternatively framed as 'starting points', derogation would be possible but, as with a rebuttable presumption, this would require specific and compelling justification. 23 Two years earlier, in T v T [1988] Fam 52, doctors had sought legal protection for their decision to terminate a mentally incapacitated woman's pregnancy and sterilise her at the same time. Wood J granted the declaration, on the grounds that 'a medical adviser is justified in taking such steps as good medical practice "demands"' (at 68), despite 'the fact that the operative procedures proposed are prima facie acts of trespass' (at 67), to which no one, not even the court, could give consent. 24 n 1 above.
The argument of counsel revealed the startling fact that there is no English authority on the question whether as a matter of common law (and if so in what circumstances) medical treatment can lawfully be given to a person who is disabled by mental incapacity from consenting to it. 25 The previous year, in Re B (A Minor) (Wardship: Sterilisation), 26 this uncertainty had lent urgency to the court's decision to authorise B's sterilisation before her 18 th birthday:
It is clearly to the interest of the ward that this matter be decided now and without further delay. We should be no wiser in 12 months' time than we are now and it would be doubtful then what legal courses would be open in the circumstances. 27 Then in Re F (Mental Patient: Sterilisation) , 28 the House of Lords found a solution to the 'startling' absence of legal authority in the doctrine of necessity, and declared that it would be in her best interests, and therefore lawful, to sterilise a 36-year-old woman, who had 'the mental capacity of a child of four to five'. 29 According to Lord Bridge, it was 'axiomatic that treatment which is necessary to preserve the life, health or well being of the patient may lawfully be given without consent'. 30 But if 'necessity' only covered the provision of treatment where a person's life was at risk, 'many of those unfortunate enough to be deprived of the capacity to make or communicate rational decisions by accident, illness or unsoundness of mind might be deprived of treatment which it would be entirely beneficial for them to receive'. 31 'Necessity' was thus extended to include treatment that was provided in the person's best interests.
This common law principle survived until it was codified in section 1(5) of the Mental Capacity To take a simple example, imagine that P has been a lifelong adherent of the Jehovah's Witness faith, but that she has not executed an advance decision refusing blood products. P now lacks capacity and expresses vehemently to the judge her unwillingness to undergo a blood transfusion. In this case, P's wishes can be ascertained, and if given primacy, might be likely to cause her significant physical harm.
Since those wishes represent P's deeply held values and beliefs, there might nevertheless be a good reason to respect them.
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Of course, most decisions are not this straightforward or clear-cut, and I do not mean to suggest that these presumptions would convert sensitive, fact-specific judgments about where P's best interests lie into the formulaic application of an inflexible algorithm. Clearly there will still be important and difficult judgments to make about when a risk of harm is significant, and what counts as a profoundly important belief. In addition, it may be necessary to consider whether there are circumstances which justify departing from the rebuttable presumption in the particular case. But a presumption that P is heard in court proceedings, and that, in certain circumstances, her wishes should be decisive, would help to ensure that current best practice in the Court of Protection is the starting point whenever a doctor or 78 court is faced with an incapacitated adult who has a view about her medical treatment that matters (or did matter) deeply to her.
P's Involvement in Court Proceedings
The Court of Protection is involved in a tiny minority of medical decisions taken on behalf of adults who lack capacity. Where treatment is routine, and there is no dispute, decisions are taken by clinicians in what they consider to be P's best interests. The Mental Capacity Act Code of Practice and the Court of Protection's Practice Direction 9E set out the limited circumstances in which it is appropriate to seek a declaration from the Court of Protection before proceeding with medical treatment. These include the proposed withholding of clinically assisted nutrition and hydration; 80 live organ donation; nontherapeutic sterilisation, and 'all other cases where there is a doubt or dispute about whether a particular treatment will be in a person's best interests'. 81 Also 'likely to be referred to the court' are cases 'where there are otherwise irresolvable conflicts between healthcare staff, or between staff and family members', 82 or where 'it is unclear whether proposed serious and/or invasive medical treatment is likely to be in the best interests of the person who lacks capacity to consent'.
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Although the local NHS body should refer cases where it is not clear whether a procedure is in P's best interests, it is, of course, possible that the professionals responsible for P's care will be confident in their best interests decision, and, if P's relatives agree with them, there may be no lack of clarity, and no apparent dispute, and hence no referral. 83 ibid, para 8.24. Para 3 of Practice Direction 9E, which supplements the Court of Protection Rules 2007, sets out the procedure to be followed when an application to the Court of Protection 'concerns serious medical treatment in relation to P'. It specifies that medical treatment should be considered 'serious' where 'there is a fine balance between its benefits to P and the burdens and risks it is likely to entail for him', or where 'the treatment, procedure or investigation proposed would be likely to involve serious consequences for P', such as 'serious and prolonged pain, distress or side effects', or 'a serious impact on P's future life choices'. 84 House of Lords Select Committee on the Mental Capacity Act 2005, n 18 above, para 235.
It is striking that the fact that P objects to the treatment is not set out in Trusts should apply to the Court of Protection in order to obtain orders relating to P's obstetric care.
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Once a case does come before the Court of Protection, although there has recently been a shift in approach, the court's 'original practices and procedures were not built upon the presumption that P would routinely participate directly in cases that are about them'. 87 It is, as Series et al note, somewhat surprising that 'a jurisdiction wholly devoted to matters concerning people with mental disabilities' had until recently 'given no systematic consideration to the special measures and reasonable adjustments that would be needed to facilitate the participation of P'. 88 And indeed there have been cases in which P has not just not participated, but has not even been informed that the hearing was taking place. In Re AA Might it also be possible to argue that when a decision about the medical treatment of a person who lacks capacity comes before a court, Article 6 of the ECHR requires her to have access to 'a fair and public hearing … by an independent and impartial tribunal'? A 'fair hearing' would ordinarily mean that she is entitled to be heard in person by that tribunal. that, in proceedings to authorise a deprivation of liberty, 'it is generally considered indispensable in this country for the person whose liberty is at stake automatically to be a party to the proceedings in which the issue is to be decided'. 98 If P must be joined as a party, when her liberty is at stake, it would be difficult to justify the conclusion that giving medical treatment to P against her wishes is less intrusive, such that joining her as a party is unnecessary. 99 In some cases, non-consensual medical treatment will be more invasive and intrusive than preventing P from leaving a care home. A locked door may restrict a person's liberty, but pinning someone down in order to give her an injection violates her bodily integrity as well. Furthermore, the judge might meet the patient when she is having a particularly good or bad day (although it should be admitted that this may be the case whenever a judge hears directly from anyone).
In any event, the patient's account of her preferences will not be the only evidence before the judge, and consideration may have to be given to practical matters like toilet facilities, and to questions like: 'Where and how will the Court's decision be communicated to P?' 111 It is therefore clear that that the judiciary is increasingly willing to take steps proactively to involve P directly in proceedings in which her medical treatment is at stake. As a result, it would be a small step to amend Rule 3A in order to provide that, in keeping with the principle that P should always be at the centre of any decision about her medical treatment, the starting point, or presumption should be that the court should hear from P directly, unless to do so would not be reasonably practicable. EWCOP 41, AB's solicitor described the extensive steps that were taken to ensure that AB understood what was happening and that the environment was as comfortable and non-threatening as possible For example, photographs were taken 'of the judge, the courtroom and all the lawyers involved in the proceedings to explain to P the physical location and the identity of all involved in advance of the hearing', and arrangements were made for 'P to be supported by staff regarding personal care, and ensuring mobile hoists were provided for P in both locations for care'. See further https://courtofprotectionhandbook.com/2016/09/30/guestpost-facilitating-participation-of-p-in-court-of-protection-proceedings/ (last accessed 4 August 2017).
Article 8 and the right to have one's wishes given appropriate weight
It is axiomatic that Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights -the right to respect for private and family life -incorporates, for adults who have capacity, a broad right to self-determination. 112 As Lord Hughes put it in Nicklinson v Ministry of Justice: 'The reach of article 8 can now be seen to be extensive'. 113 If we consider David Feldman's explanation of why treatment against one's wishes represents an interference with the human rights of patients with capacity, it is by no means self-evident that adults who lack capacity should be treated as an exception:
Being subjected to treatment, especially invasive treatment, without one's consent is calculated to threaten one's sense of one's own worth and the feeling of being valued by others. How valuable can a person be, one might ask, if others are prepared to do things to him which remove from him any control over his own destiny? What could be less compatible with one's dignity than being treated as a person to whom such a thing might be done lawfully and properly? 114 Certainly nothing in Article 8 requires respect for a patient's refusal of unwanted medical treatment to be subject to a mental capacity cliff edge. 115 Rather, for incapacitated patients too, 'non-consensual treatment can be seen as interfering with their dignity, in that the patient may both feel demeaned and be regarded by others as being subject to demeaning domination by the decision-makers, whether medical or judicial'. 116 Although in other contexts, 'dignity' has been accused of being a rather vague and slippery concept, 117 here it captures the idea that a person is 'entitled to give an account of herself (and of the way in which she is regulating her actions and organising her life), an account that others are to pay attention to'. another's life, and that is the case irrespective of whether or not that person has the legal ability to give a valid consent to medical treatment. When a patient lacks the capacity to consent to an act which would be tortious in the absence of consent, the Mental Capacity Act provides a solution, namely that it is lawful to provide treatment in her best interests. But it would be a mistake to conflate a mechanism through which someone can be treated lawfully, despite her inability to consent, with the removal of her interest in having her views about what is to be done to her body treated with respect.
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Accepting that there are times when decisions have to be made on behalf of someone who lacks capacity does not mean that her voice thereby becomes irrelevant. One of the most frightening aspects of the loss of capacity through conditions such as dementia is the feeling that one is no longer treated as someone of value. 123 As Catriona MacKenzie has argued, healthcare professionals should be under an obligation to recognise each patient's humanity, 'that is, to treat her as someone, with a conception of herself and for whom certain things matter' (emphasis in original). 124 Preserving a patient's sense that she is a person whose views count is an important way of treating her as a subject, 125 rather than as an object to whom things can be done without asking first. Returning to Re F (Mental Patient: Sterilisation), 126 it is clear that F was the object of the proceedings, rather than their subject. She is present in the judgment not as a person with a history, a biography and a sense of self, but as a clinical and legal dilemma to be resolved by others.
Perhaps no one thought to seek F's reaction to the prospect of sterilisation because she was unable to communicate through speech. But an inability to speak does not mean that someone has 'nothing to tell us'. 127 Rather as those who care for non-verbal children and adults know, they may be perfectly capable of understanding a choice and expressing a view, provided that sufficient effort is put into enabling them to communicate using means other than words.
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It is noteworthy that despite moves to outlaw discrimination over the course of the twentieth century, as recently as 1989, the views of one category of people in society -those suffering from impaired decision-making ability -were routinely treated as less worthy of respect than the views of others, in that they were customarily not listened to at all. 129 This is how we make decisions about animals, or about inanimate objects, but, as Jeremy Waldron explains, it should not be how we make decisions about people:
Applying a norm to a human individual is not like deciding what to do about a rabid animal or a dilapidated house. It involves paying attention to a point of view and respecting the personality of the entity one is dealing with. As such it embodies a crucial dignitarian idea -respecting the dignity of those to whom the norms are applied as beings capable of explaining themselves. 130 Taking seriously the views of the patient who lacks capacity has practical benefits aside from protection of the person's right to be treated with respect and dignity. 131 It might, for example, have positive effects on her wellbeing and self-esteem, and on the quality of her relationship with healthcare professionals.
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Indeed, there is considerable evidence that providing opportunities for people with cognitive disabilities to exercise control and choice is associated with better outcomes for them. 133 As Oliver Lewis puts it, a 'finding of incompetence may end up being a self-fulfilling prophecy: we lose skills if we do not practice them. If other people take our decisions for us, we will become less talented at taking them ourselves'. there may be good reasons to respect that refusal, even if she lacks the mental capacity to take the decision for herself.
Article 12(4) of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) requires that 'measures relating to the exercise of legal capacity respect the rights, will and preferences of the person'. The Oxford English Dictionary's definition of 'respect' is to 'treat or regard with deference, esteem, or honour', which implies more than simply taking P's views into account. As Martin et al explain: 'whatever "respect" means in this context, it must be something stronger than "consider," even though it is less than "be absolutely bound by." 137 It would therefore appear that the Mental Capacity Act's section 4 best interests checklist, which gives no particular priority to P's 'will and preferences', and treats them as simply one relevant factor among many, is not compliant with Article 12(4) of the UN CRPD. In what follows, I will suggest that it is possible to sketch out two circumstances in which there could be a presumption in favour of respecting an incapacitated patient's wish to refuse unwanted medical treatment. First, if respecting her refusal would not be likely to result in any significant harm to her, overruling her wishes would not serve an important medical purpose. The psychological and emotional harm, and the erosion of trust, that might be likely to result from imposing treatment upon her against her wishes would not be outweighed by significant health benefits. When the harms of treating and not treating her are weighed in the balance, it would be reasonable to come down in favour of respecting her desire not to receive the treatment in question.
Secondly, if respecting the person's wishes might result in significant harm to her, but those wishes nevertheless reflect her deeply and profoundly held values (rather than resulting from a phobia or delusion, for example), then Article 8 could require us to refrain from treating her against her wishes, despite this risk of harm. 138 Once again, the psychological harm that is done to someone by imposing treatment upon her, where to do so goes against beliefs that are profoundly important to her, should be put in the balance with the physical harm that might be caused if she does not receive the treatment in question. As Jonathan Herring has explained in the context of a discussion about whether the 'out of character' preferences of the 'just competent' should be respected:
A key issue then, where a person is wishing to engage in an act which will cause them harm, is to consider whether the act is an exercise of autonomy in the richest sense. That is whether it reflects beliefs that are central to him or herself and are an expression of identity. Where it is, it deserves respect; where it is not then it counts for less. 139 Of course, there will always be a small number of patients who have never been able to communicate, or who have never had any discernible wishes and values. In some cases, substitute rather than supported decision-making is therefore inevitable. But a scheme for according varying weight to the treatment refusals of patients who lack capacity better reflects the reality that people who lack capacity are not a homogenous group, and that a simple finding of incapacity does not necessarily justify overruling their wishes.
Giving weight to P's wishes (a)
Primacy unless significant harm 138 Herring n 9 above. 139 ibid. circumstances it might be acceptable to give medical treatment to P against her wishes. Nor does it distinguish between refusals of unwanted treatment and positive requests for treatment, thus suggesting that a patient's wish not to undergo an invasive procedure need not be given any more weight than a patient's desire to receive a particular treatment.
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In deciding whether to treat a patient against her wishes, those wishes are one factor, and the judgment of the treating clinician as to what treatment is in her best interests, is another. In such a scenario, following the patient's wishes might be likely to lead to harm, given that this is not the course of treatment that her clinician believes will lead to the best health outcome, while at the same time, there will be psychological or emotional harm to P from treating her against her wishes, which might be invasive and demeaning and, in some cases, positively traumatic. 145 Essentially, it is necessary to balance those two harms, in order to determine whether the harm from not receiving beneficial medical care is outweighed, or not, by the harm of having one's wish not to receive treatment overruled.
This balancing exercise could also be expressed more positively, in terms of weighing the benefits of enabling P to make a decision for herself, against the health benefits likely to flow from following medical advice. Being able to exercise some control over the risks to which she is exposed might benefit the person who lacks capacity, through what has been described as the 'dignity of risk'. Where the risk to P's health from not receiving the treatment she wishes to refuse is trivial, it is likely that the psychological harm from forcing treatment upon her will trump the harm from not receiving the recommended treatment. If the damage to P's health might be likely to be significant, the balancing act will be more difficult (as explained below), but the harm from going against P's wishes will continue to be real and significant. In Surrey and Sussex Healthcare NHS Trust v AB, 148 for example, a case in which Keehan J decided that it would be in the best interests of a woman who would be likely to die within the next 10 days if her leg was not amputated for the operation to go ahead, Keehan J nevertheless admitted that 'the impact of the proposed surgery on her mental health is unknown but, at least, in the first instance, is likely to be deleterious'.
Qualifying the primacy given to P's wish to refuse treatment by taking into account any risk of significant harm is a way of capturing the importance of not abandoning patients who lack capacity to their autonomy. I come back to this point below in the context of delusions and phobias, but as Michael Dunn and Charles Foster have explained, a narrow version of autonomy as a right to be left alone or 'free to fend for oneself' might mean that we fail to care properly for adults who cannot look after themselves: 'If one aims to deliver only the minimum level of support, one is teetering always on the brink of neglect'. 152 The key question, as set out by Michael Bach and Lana Kerzner in their recommendations to the Ontario Law Commission is 'how the law can balance the right to autonomy while safeguarding people who may be vulnerable to abuse and neglect'. 153 Historically, the law has tended to 'protect' adults who lack capacity by adopting an 'overly-paternalistic approach which has undermined individual autonomy'. 154 A presumption in favour of following P's wishes reverses the traditional presumption in favour of paternalism, and instead requires there to be specific justification for a failure to respect P's wishes.
(b) Primacy even if significant harm, if the decision reflects P's deeply held values
Once it has been established that there is a risk of significant harm to P from following her wishes, the next stage might be for the decision-maker to ask herself whether the strength and depth of P's wishes are such that the risk of harm from treating her against her wishes might nevertheless outweigh the significant harm she is likely to suffer if she does not receive the medical treatment to which she objects (or has objected in the past, if she can no longer express a view). This will necessitate exploration of the importance to P of her wishes or values in relation to this treatment decision. So far, I have used terms like the patient's 'values', 'wishes', 'preferences' and 'beliefs' as if they are interchangeable, when of course they are not. Indeed, a patient's values, wishes and beliefs will sometimes be in tension with each other. A patient might 'prefer' not to receive a pain-killing injection, while also 'wishing' to be pain-free.
Or a patient with a breech pregnancy might have a 'belief' in natural childbirth, at the same time as a 'desire' that her child is born alive. Untangling what matters most to the patient, and identifying what might be said to be her core values and beliefs, will not always be straightforward.
Nevertheless, it is clear that when a patient's wish reflects the way in which she has chosen to live her life, this should count for more than an out-of-character or fluctuating whim. In recent cases, It will also often be necessary to distinguish between wishes which reflect a person's core values, and wishes which instead are the result of delusions, phobias or addictions. Not 'all statements about "what I want"' are, in fact, 'meaningful acts of "will"'. 161 To respect the wishes of someone suffering from psychosis or delirium is not to treat her with dignity, but might instead amount to abandoning her when she needs help and support. A patient who is refusing a blood transfusion as a result of her needle phobia needs support in order to enable her to receive treatment which she would want to receive if she could see beyond her overwhelming fear of injections. In a case like this, properly 'supported' decisionmaking might amount to treatment without consent: the risk of harm is significant, and the patient's terror of needles does not reflect her deeply held values. 162 In Cambridge University Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust v BF, 163 Macdonald J had to determine whether a total abdominal hysterectomy was in the best interests of a woman suffering from severe paranoid schizophrenia who had been diagnosed with Stage IIIB ovarian cancer. Her expressed wishes were contradictory: when she had capacity, she had agreed to the treatment and signed a consent form, but later she had said that she did not want the operation to go ahead, on the grounds that 'bad voices'
and 'bad machines' were controlling her mind. Without the operation, she might be likely to die within six months. The risk of harm was significant, and the grounds for her refusal were the result of 'intrusive auditory hallucinations telling her not to have the surgery'. 164 MacDonald J was therefore convinced that BF would be likely to 'prioritise potentially life-saving treatment and the chance of continued life over the opportunity to bear children in the circumstances where, left untreated, her ovarian cancer will likely result in her death'.
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Anorexia nervosa presents a particular challenge here. 166 On the one hand, it is hard not to be sympathetic to the view expressed by E's parents in A Local Authority v E:
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It seems strange to us that the only people who don't seem to have the right to die when there is no further appropriate treatment available are those with an eating disorder. This is based on the assumption that they can never have capacity around any issues connected to food. There is a logic to this, but not from the perspective of the sufferer who is not extended the same rights as any other person. 168 On the other hand, it is clear that people with anorexia often feel controlled by their condition, 169 and the 'desire' not to consume calories is not necessarily a reflection of deeply held values, but may instead be a symptom of what Charland et al describe as a destructive and all-consuming 'passion':
It is not clear that a person driven by a passion is acting autonomously. …To help the person to be free from the grip of the passion and attain a greater degree of autonomy over her life, it may be necessary to impose upon her a routine that has a chance of breaking down the self-destructive patterns of behavior that is both part of, and helps to maintain, the passion that is anorexia nervosa. 170 As Tan et al explain, it is common for patients with anorexia to experience considerable ambivalence about treatment:
First, there may be advantages to having anorexia nervosa, which the patient may not wish to give up.
Second, the patient may feel that changing behaviour is not a choice she can make, even if she wants to.
Third, the patient may wish to be coerced before she can comply with treatment. Fourth, the patient may feel simultaneous wishes to have and not to have treatment. 171 Of course, that does not mean that treatment without consent is always justifiable in patients with anorexia, 172 rather, careful and sensitive assessment of the depth and strength of each individual's 'will and preferences' will be necessary. 173 Also challenging are scenarios in which the patient's current wishes appear to contradict the values and beliefs that mattered to her when she had capacity. If the patient had executed a valid and applicable advance decision (AD) in relation to the treatment in question, that is binding upon the medical team, unless they have reasonable grounds for believing that she has subsequently done anything 'clearly inconsistent' with the advance decision. 174 But in the absence of a binding AD, a judgment will have to be made as to whether the patient's past wishes were sufficiently deeply held and profoundly important that they justify overriding her present preferences. There is insufficient space here to explore the broader philosophical question of whether a patient's 'precedent autonomy' should trump her present wishes, and therefore be binding upon her after she loses capacity. 175 In practice, if there are reasonable grounds for doubt about what matters to the patient, then just as when there is doubt about the validity or applicability of an advance decision, protecting her from harm might reasonably take priority.
(c) What if the patient cannot express a view?
If the patient cannot express a view about the proposed treatment, and did not execute an advance decision before she lost capacity, the decision-maker should be under a duty to try to ascertain her previously expressed values and beliefs, in order to work out what choice she would be likely to have made if she had capacity. In these circumstances, it may make sense to adopt the UN Committee on the interests" determinations'. 177 The decision-maker, and in the Court of Protection the judge, will have to evaluate such evidence as there is of her previous wishes. This is not always straightforward, since it will often involve relying upon the testimony of family members, who might find it challenging to separate out what P would have wanted from what they want for P. 178 It is also possible that P might have expressed apparently contradictory wishes and beliefs in the past, for example, a belief in the sanctity of human life and a preference not to be kept alive in a vegetative state.
Once P's wishes and beliefs have been identified, they will have to be put in the balance with other considerations. If the risk of harm from not receiving the recommended treatment is significant, then P's previously expressed wish not to receive a particular treatment should be permitted to trump the need to protect her from physical harm, but only if it has been established that her refusal was grounded in beliefs that mattered deeply to her.
(d) What if the patient has never been able to express a view?
In the tiny number of cases in which there is no view from P to take into account, because she has never had the capacity to hold or express any beliefs or preferences, decisions about her medical treatment have to be taken by others. In cases of 'factual incapability to act or decide ', 179 where what Kim Atkins has called 'the subjective character of experience' 180 is either absent or completely undetectable, it is better to admit the inevitability of substitute decision-making than to pretend that the decision-maker can engage realistically in 'supported' decision-making, or give a 'best interpretation of P's will and preferences'. Where decisions have to be taken without any reference to the views, values or preferences of P, substitute decision-making is justifiable because P is unable to contribute anything to the decision and therefore needs others to take decisions on her behalf, based upon their assessment of P's needs and interests. This could continue to be framed as the Mental Capacity Act's 'best interests' test, or as the Scottish test that any intervention 'will benefit the adult and that such benefit cannot reasonably be It is in relation to this very small number of patients for whom no view, past or present, can be identified that the UN Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities' General Comment appears to some commentators to part company with reality. 182 According to the General Comment, it is never permissible for anyone other than the person concerned to appoint a substitute decision-maker. Nor is it acceptable ever to invoke the person's best interests when deciding how to treat them; according to the General Comment: 'The "best interests" principle is not a safeguard which complies with article 12 in relation to adults.
But if the person has never had any discernible will or preferences, the 'legal fiction' of coming to the 'best interpretation' of her will and preferences will be masking the fact that the decision can be taken only in the light of what others believe to be in P's interests. 183 As Mary Donnelly has argued, admitting that this is necessarily substituted, rather than supported decision-making facilitates 'rigorous oversight' of the decision-maker's paternalistic judgment, rather than deflecting scrutiny through the 'subterfuge' that the decision simply reflects P's 'will and preferences'. Convention itself does not state that substitute decision-making must be abolished, nor does the Convention explicitly prohibit 'best interests' decision-making. 185 If P has never had any will and preferences, invoking non-existent 'will and preferences' in order to come to what is, in fact, a 'best interests' decision involves unhelpful and potentially distracting sleight of hand. that is the strategy he has always both expressed and adopted. I have no doubt that he would wish to leave the hospital and go to the home of his ex-wife and his mate's Spud and end his days quietly there and with dignity as he sees it '. 193 But while it would be possible to describe this decision as one in which Hayden J gave priority to TH's wish to have no further treatment because that reflected his deeply held values, the judiciary has tended to resist further specification of the best interests test, on the grounds that these cases are factspecific, 194 and 'infinitely variable'. 195 For example, in M v N, 196 in setting out the respect to be afforded
7.
Presumptions vs judicial discretion
Respecting individual autonomy does not always require P's wishes to be afforded predominant weight.
Sometimes it will be right to do so, sometimes it will not. The factors that fall to be considered in this intensely complex process are infinitely variable e.g. the nature of the contemplated treatment, how intrusive such treatment might be and crucially what the outcome of that treatment maybe for the individual patient. Into that complex matrix the appropriate weight to be given to P's wishes will vary. 197 Similarly, in Wye Valley NHS Trust v B, 198 Peter Jackson said that: 'there is no theoretical limit to the weight or lack of weight that should be given to the person's wishes and feelings, beliefs and values. In some cases, the conclusion will be that little weight or no weight can be given; in others, very significant weight will be due'.
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The weight given to P's wishes will inevitably vary, but at the same time, it might be helpful, especially for clinicians, patients and relatives, if an attempt was made to set out the circumstances in which P's wishes normally might be expected to be either disregarded or followed. Indeed, in M v N, In this case, with the help of her family, Hayden J had painted a vivid picture of Mrs N's personality and priorities, through which it had become evident that '[f]ew … were less well placed to withstand the ravages and vicissitudes of this degenerative disease than Mrs N'. 202 Hayden J was therefore:
left with little doubt that Mrs. N would have been appalled to contemplate the early pain, increasing dependency and remorseless degeneration that has now characterised her life for so long. I have no difficulty in accepting the family's view that she would not wish to continue as she is. 203 The recognition that these cases are fact-specific and that the decision that ANH should be withdrawn from Mrs N does not have any precedent value when deciding whether to withdraw ANH from a future Mrs O, P or Q, need not bar the construction of a 'roadmap' in order to guide future decision-making. 208 Hayden J put this down to the fact that they had 'not absorbed the full force of Lady Hale's judgment in Aintree and the emphasis placed on a 'holistic' evaluation when assessing both "wishes and feelings" and "best interests"'. 209 And in M v N, at the outset of the case, 'and until the conclusion of the family's evidence the Official Solicitor took the view that the strong presumption in favour of the benefit of the continuance of life had not been displaced'.
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As we saw earlier, the House of Lords Select Committee heard evidence that the best interests test was poorly understood by clinicians, 211 who, according to the British Institute of Learning Difficulties, too frequently interpreted it 'in a medical/paternalistic sense which is wholly at odds with that set out in the Act'. 212 And respondents to the Law Commission's 2017 consultation on mental capacity confirmed that the 'concept of best interests was often interpreted in a medical and paternalistic sense':
Family carers reported that best interests decisions by health and social care professionals were often made without reference to their loved one's wishes and feelings, and that professionals often "pick and choose" which factors on the check-list to prioritise to suit their own preferred outcomes. 213 If the best interests test continues to be misapplied by those who are most frequently responsible for taking medical decisions for adults who lack capacity, 214 giving some further structure to decision-making under the statute may lead to better decisions, and greater consistency. 215 The flexibility of the section 4 checklist has undoubtedly enabled the judiciary to apply it sensitively and empathetically, in order to produce patient-centred decisions about what medical treatment is in P's best interests. But with the advantages of flexibility come the potential disadvantages of inconsistency, such as the likelihood that different decision-makers will come to different decisions on the same facts. 216 If respect for the patient's wishes matters, it is unsatisfactory for too much to turn on who happens to be making the best interests assessment on any particular day.
In A Local Authority v E, 217 Peter Jackson J acknowledged that, when deciding whether force feeding was in E's best interests, 'any decision is a heavy one', at the same time as admitting that 'The balancing exercise is not mechanistic but intuitive and there are weighty factors on each side of the scales'. 218 Given the negative consequences for P of being treated against her wishes, it might be argued that a more structured approach to determining when P might reasonably expect to have her refusal of treatment respected may be preferable to an approach grounded in judicial intuition. 219 test, there may still be good reasons to give effect to her preference not to receive a particular treatment, if this would not cause her significant harm, or if that preference is a product of her core values and beliefs. This may now be best practice in the Court of Protection, but it is not self-evident that it embodies current practice among healthcare professionals, or even of the Official Solicitor.
I am conscious that judges, in particular, are likely to balk at the introduction of statutory presumptions into these inevitably fact-specific cases, 221 and that it might be more acceptable to include them in the Code of Practice, and perhaps to describe them instead simply as 'starting points'. In both cases, however, specific and defensible justification for departing from the presumption or starting point should be required. Regardless of how it is formulated, busy and non-legally trained healthcare professionals are unlikely to consult the law reports regularly, and need clearer prospective guidance than the Act and its Code of Practice currently provides that an incapacitated patient's refusal of medical treatment should be taken seriously, and should be overruled only if the risk to which she would thereby be exposed meets a threshold level of seriousness, and her refusal is not grounded in values or beliefs that are of profound importance to her.
Conclusion
In Kings College Hospital NHS Foundation Trust v C, 222 Macdonald J was faced with 'a finely balanced case that sits close to the border that runs between an individual with capacity making an unwise decision and an individual lacking capacity to make the decision in question'. 223 C was refusing to consent to dialysis, without which she would die. There was some evidence that C suffered from a personality disorder, but C's daughter believed that her mother had:
reached a clear and reasoned decision by giving weight to the factors that are important to her (a risk of a life lived on dialysis that is unacceptable to her, a risk of long term disability that is unacceptable to her, exhaustion with treatment and her wish not to endure further weeks or months of the same, her wish not to continue to endure the symptoms and pain associated with treatment, the risk she will not be able to attain 220 M. Browning, C. Bigby, and J. Douglas, 'Supported decision making: Understanding how its conceptual link to legal capacity is influencing the development of practice' (2014) 1 Research and Practice in Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities 34-45. 221 Although a subsection which covers a particular sort of decision, and a particular sort of value or belief, might seem peculiar, it is worth noting that section 4(5) refers to a particular sort of medical treatment, and whether a particular outcome is 'desired'. 222 [2015] EWCOP 80. 223 ibid at [64].
her former "sparkly" lifestyle, her desire not to get old and lose her appearance and her wish to attain her original goal of ending her life). 224 In concluding, on balance, that C did have capacity, and hence was entitled to refuse to consent to dialysis, Macdonald J's decision was at odds with 'the considered opinions of two very experienced psychiatrists'. 225 He explained this disagreement as being 'in large part a product of this being a finely balanced case in which a number of reasonable interpretations of the information available are possible'.
226
It could be argued that this case offers a good illustration of the artificial cliff edge created by the binary threshold test for capacity. If C had capacity, she could make the 'foolish' decision to refuse dialysis. If C lacked capacity, the decision would be taken for her, in her best interests. The presumptions set out above would mean that, in a case like that of C, less would turn on the 'finely balanced' question of whether C's personality disorder had impaired her decision-making ability. Instead, because C's wish to refuse treatment was clearly the product of values that mattered deeply to her, then despite the risk of significant harm, there might be a presumption that her refusal to undergo dialysis should be respected, even if she lacked capacity.
It might be argued that rigorous application of section 1 of the Mental Capacity Act 2005, including the presumption of capacity, 227 and the principle that 'a person is not to be treated as unable to make a decision unless all practicable steps to help him to do so have been taken without success ', 228 should mean that fewer people fail the MCA's capacity test, and hence are able to take decisions, including unwise decisions, 229 for themselves. But even if it is possible that more people might be able to make decisions for themselves if more resources were put into helping them to do so, if there continues to be a legal test for capacity based upon people's ability to weigh information in the balance in order to arrive at a choice, there will continue to be people who fail the capacity test. Given evidence of inconsistent best interests decision-making, including failures to treat P's wishes with appropriate respect, it seems sensible to consider giving decision-makers clearer guidance on how to resolve any tension between P's beliefs and her doctor's medical advice.
In its final report and draft Bill, the Law Commission has proposed that the legislation is amended to ensure that decision-makers must 'ascertain', rather than merely 'consider' P's wishes, 230 and that they 'must give particular weight to any wishes or feelings ascertained'. 231 The draft Bill also places additional requirements on decision-makers 'to explain their decisions not to follow wishes and feelings'. 232 Some respondents had recommended the introduction of a 'rebuttable presumption that [P's] wishes and feelings should be followed (with departure only occurring if there were "compelling reasons" or "serious adverse consequences")'. 233 While the Law Commission was 'attracted by the idea of a rebuttable presumption', it concluded that this could not be achieved by a simple amendment to section 4, but would instead 'require the amendment of section 1', in order that P's wishes could trump the section 1(5) principle that any act done for P must be done in her best interests. 234 This option had not been consulted upon and, according to the Law Commission, 'would be far beyond our remit'.
235
The Law Commission's proposals are undoubtedly a further positive step in the direction of treating P's views as worthy of particular respect. It could, however, be argued that the more specific presumptions outlined above would be easier for patients, relatives and healthcare professionals to understand, and have significantly more teeth than a requirement simply to give P's wishes 'particular weight'. If the court is under a duty to 'ascertain' P's views, this might be implemented most effectively through a presumption that P is heard from directly in any case involving her medical treatment.
Presumptions instruct decision-makers, and, crucially, reassure P, that falling on the 'wrong' side of the capacity cliff edge, now or in the future, will not convert P's life into one over which she has no decision-making authority. Giving P's wishes 'particular weight' does not tell decision-makers, and P herself, in advance, when she might reasonably expect to receive the same respect for her interest in
exercising control over what is done to her body as those of us who are, for now, fortunate enough to fall on the other side of the capacity cliff edge. 
